|
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS - FAQ
Q. What are WMD?
Q. What is the purpose of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)?
Q. What is the Statement of Principles?
Q. What practical steps can States take to contribute to the PSI?
Q. Is there a blacklist of states of concern?
Q. Isn't the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) little better than state piracy?
Q. What has the PSI achieved since its inception?
Q. International endorsement for PSI?
Q. Will the PSI affect legitimate dual-use commerce?
Q. How does PSI relate to other nonproliferation regimes?
Q. How will PSI efforts be funded?
Q. How will information be transmitted among PSI participants?
Q.What are Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)?
A. There is no universally accepted definition of the phrase 'weapons of mass destruction'. However, WMD is generally taken to refer to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
Q. What is the purpose of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)?
A. The PSI builds on existing mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, consistent with national authorities and relevant international law.
The PSI aims to impede and stop illegal shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems and related materials. The PSI complements other national and international non-proliferation efforts, including the work of the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) and the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency).
Q. What is the Statement of Principles?
A. The Statement of Interdiction Principles sets out concrete actions for a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. All PSI participants have endorsed the Statement of Principles and encourage other states to do so publicly.
Q. What practical steps can States take to contribute to the PSI?
A. States can contribute to the PSI by taking the following practical steps:
-
Formally commit to and publicly endorse the PSI and the Statement of Principles and indicate a willingness to take all steps available to support PSI efforts.
-
Undertake a review and provide information on current national legal authorities to undertake interdictions at sea, in the air, or on land.
-
Identify specific national assets that might contribute to PSI efforts (e.g. information sharing, military and/or law enforcement assets).
-
Provide points of contact for PSI interdiction assistance requests and other operational activities. Establish appropriate internal government processes to coordinate PSI response efforts.
-
Be willing to participate actively in PSI interdiction training exercises and actual operations as opportunities arise.
-
Be willing to consider signing relevant agreements (e.g. boarding arrangements) or to otherwise establish a concrete basis for cooperation with PSI efforts (e.g. MOU on over-flight denial).
Q. Is there a blacklist of states of concern?
A. No. The PSI aims to help prevent trafficking in WMD by any state or non-state actor engaged in or supporting WMD proliferation programmes, at any time and in any place.
Q. Isn't the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) little better than state piracy?
A. Not at all. The PSI coalition members have made clear that any action taken will be in accordance with international law.
Q. What has the PSI achieved since its inception?
A. Interdiction operations, by their very nature, are generally not publicised. However, since the Initiative’s inception PSI partners have quietly cooperated on several successful interdiction efforts. Through participation in operational experts meetings and live interdiction exercises, PSI partners continue to enhance their collective ability to carry out interdiction efforts to impede and stop shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials to and from states of proliferation concern.
Q. International endorsement for PSI?
A. More than 80 states, as well as multilateral organisations such as the EU, have expressed support for the PSI. This number continues to grow.
The PSI can be seen as a step in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (28 April 2004), which inter alia “calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials .” The United Nations’ High Level Group on Threats, Challenges and Change has encouraged all States to support the PSI. On 10 March, at a speech to the Madrid Summit, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said “I applaud the efforts of the Proliferation Security Initiative to fill a gap in our defences”.
Q. Will the PSI affect legitimate dual-use commerce?
A. No - quite the contrary. PSI may help foster legitimate commerce. Co-operation to stop proliferation should facilitate legitimate trade by increasing confidence in that trade. Private industries may also prefer to do business with PSI participants, as they demonstrate their commitment to protecting international commerce from those who hide proliferation among legitimate trade routes and practices.
Q. How does PSI relate to other non-proliferation regimes?
A. We have a robust toolbox of measures to prevent proliferation, including the non-proliferation treaties, multilateral export control regimes, national export controls, and enforcement measures.
The PSI complements these existing tools to help prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. It does not replace other non-proliferation mechanisms, but builds on them by providing an operational mechanism when proliferators try to evade these regimes.
Q. How will PSI efforts be funded?
A. Each participant state is responsible for funding its own efforts in support of the PSI.
Q. How will information be transmitted among PSI participants?
A. Each state that seeks to participate in the PSI is asked to identify an appropriate point of contact for sharing information, in the event a specific interdiction effort requires their active efforts or support. Sensitive information on specific interdiction cases will ordinarily be shared only with those states involved in the actual interdiction effort.
| 
